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I. INTRODUCTION
D URING THE PAST fifty years, negligence law in the United
States has undergone dramatic changes. Searching for a sys-
tem of recovery that fairly balances the interests of both plain-
tiffs and defendants, legislatures and courts throughout the
United States have moved away from harsh doctrines, such as
contributory negligence and joint and several liability, toward a
fault-based system of liability. While change began slowly, in re-
cent years there has been an avalanche of new legislation and
in 1984 from Florida State University College of Law, where he served as Presi-
dent of the Moot Court Team. Mr. Sreenan's practice includes the defense of
airlines and aviation manufacturers, other product liability matters, and insur-
ance defense and coverage matters. He is a member of the Florida Bar, and is
admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States District Courts
for the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida. Mr. Sreenan is a former Chair-
man of the Florida Bar's Aviation Law Committee and is presently a Vice-Chair of
the Products, General Liability, and Consumer Law Committee of the Tort and
Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association. Mr. Sreenan spoke
on blocking statutes and their effect on the American style of discovery, and on
suits against a foreign sovereign at the August 1994 annual meeting of the Ameri-




case law that drastically affects negligence cases, particularly
those involving multiple tortfeasors. We will examine those
changes in a historical context and analyze their effect on negli-
gence law.
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY: THE DOCTRINES OF "NO
APPORTIONMENT"
A. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff
that falls below the standard of reasonable care and contributes
as a legal cause to the harm the plaintiff has suffered.' Most
authorities believe that the doctrine originated in the 1809 Eng-
lish case of Butterfield v. Forrester.' The common law rule was that
any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff would
completely bar recovery in a negligence action.3 This was some-
times known as the "all or nothing. rule," because, a fault-free
plaintiff could recover all of his damages, but a plaintiff who was
guilty of any negligence would recover nothing.4
No one theory has been advanced to explain this harsh and
arbitrary rule.5 Some believe that the contributory negligence
doctrine had, at least in part, a penal basis, so the plaintiff was
denied recovery as punishment for his wrongful conduct.6
Sometimes the doctrine of "clean hands" was cited as justifica-
tion for barring recovery to a negligent plaintiff.7 Contributory
negligence was also based on a belief that fault for a single, indi-
visible injury could not be apportioned between two parties.8
In the United States, Massachusetts recognized contributory
negligence as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery in the 1824
case of Smith v. Smith.9 During the next century a vast majority
of states adopted the doctrine. Some believe the doctrine was
I W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at
451 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 463, 464 (1965).
2 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
3 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 65, at 452.
4 Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1090 (Fla. 1987).
5 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 65, at 452.
6 Id.
7 See id.
8 Id. at 452-53.
9 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 624 (1824).
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strengthened by the advent of the Industrial Revolution and a
perceived need to protect developing industries.1"
B. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Under the common law, the doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility developed concurrently with the doctrine of contributory
negligence." The doctrine of joint and several liability allowed
the plaintiff to sue any jointly liable tortfeasor and recover full
damages from that tortfeasor. 2 Although joint and several liabil-
ity originally applied only when defendants acted in concert, it
was later expanded to include situations where separate acts of
negligence combined to produce an injury.13 The doctrine of
joint and several liability, like the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence, was based on the assumption that injuries were indivisi-
ble and fault, therefore, could not be apportioned. 4




Beginning in the middle of this century, growing discontent
with the harsh doctrines of contributory negligence and joint
and several liability paved the way for reform. Although neither
doctrine was equitable, application of both doctrines in a given
jurisdiction achieved a rough balancing of inequities. Plaintiffs
were penalized, and defendants benefitted, by the application of
contributory negligence. On the other side of the equation,
plaintiffs benefitted and defendants were penalized by the appli-
cation of joint and several liability. Reform on one side of the
equation necessarily prompted reform on the other.
A. COMPARATWVE NEGLIGENCE
Increasing dissatisfaction with the absolute doctrine of con-
tributory negligence eventually led to the adoption of compara-
tive negligence in the vast majority ofjurisdictions in the United
10 John W. Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and
Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299, 300 (1980).
11 Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1090 (Fla. 1987).
12 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 47, at 325.
13 Id. at 325, 327.
14 Id. at 325.
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States.15 Most courts and legislatures became convinced that it
was unreasonable to place upon the plaintiff the entire risk of a
loss for Which a defendant was also responsible.' 6 Most courts
recognized that the plaintiff, by virtue of his injuries, was proba-
bly in a worse position than the defendant to bear the financial
burden of a loss. 17
An alternative to the harsh "all or nothing" rule of contribu-
tory negligence is comparative negligence, whereby responsibil-
ity for damages is apportioned between a negligent plaintiff and
a negligent defendant. By the late 1960s, only seven states had
recognized the doctrine of comparative negligence. 8 Between
1969 and 1984, however, thirty-seven states adopted the doc-
trine.' 9 Presently, forty-six states have rejected contributory neg-
ligence in favor of some form of comparative negligence. °
15 See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1994).
16 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 468-69.
17 Id. at 469.
I8 Wade, supra note 10, at 302.
19 Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform:
Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 228 (1990).
20 SeeALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (1994); A~iz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (1994);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 1993); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226 (Cal. 1975); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(b) (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp.
1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7
(Harrison 1994); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663-31 (Michie 1988); IDAHO CODE § 6-
801 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/2-1116 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-3 to -4 (Bums Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.1-.3
(West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.258a (1994); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713
(Ky. 1984); LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 156 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85
(West 1985); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1972); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
702 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.141 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1994); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1987); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981);
N.Y. Civ. PiAC. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01 to
-03 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit.-23, §§ 13-14 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1993); 42 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985); Estate of
Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1987); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992); TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-27-37 to -38 (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1995);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 1988); Bradley v. Appalachian Power
Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1994);
Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1995).
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Only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia retain
contributory negligence.2'
There are presently three forms of comparative negligence:
pure comparative negligence, modified comparative negligence,
and slight-gross.
1. Pure Comparative Negligence
Under the pure form of comparative negligence, a plaintiff's
negligence reduces his damages in proportion to the percent-
age of his or her fault.22 A defendant is liable to the plaintiff
even where the plaintiff's percentage of fault is greater than
that of the defendant.23 Pure comparative negligence is a mi-
nority position. Of the forty-six states that have adopted com-
parative negligence, only thirteen have adopted the pure
form.24
While modified comparative negligence is the clear favorite of
state legislators, pure comparative negligence has been en-
dorsed by the majority of commentators.25 Advocates of the
pure form of comparative negligence argue that it is the only
fair way to apportion fault.26 The major criticism of pure com-
parative negligence is that, under certain circumstances, it may
permit a primary wrongdoer to recover against a minor wrong-
doer.27 While that may be true in some cases, the harshness of
that reality is tempered by the fact that any recovery by the plain-
21 See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815 (Ala. 1980); Harrison v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894 (Md. 1983); Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp.,
268 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1980); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Winesett, 303 S.E.2d
868 (Va. 1983).
22 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 472.
23 Id.
24 Those states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Wash-
ington. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505
(1994); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81
(West Supp. 1995); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2323 (West Supp. 1995); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511
(Mich. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d
11 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PiAc. L. & R.
1411 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (1985); WASH REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.005 (West 1988).
25 Mutter, supra note 19, at 245.
26 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 471-72.
27 Id. at 472.
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tiff is reduced proportionally according to the percentage of the
plaintiff's negligence. 28
2. Modified Comparative Negligence
Under the modified system, a plaintiff can recover as long as
the plaintiff's negligence is below a certain percentage of the
total fault. 29 Thirty-one states utilize some form of modified
comparative negligence. 0
There are two types of modified comparative negligence.
Under the modified "not greater than" approach, a plaintiff may
recover as long as his or her fault does not exceed that of the
defendant.31 This is often referred to as the "fifty percent"
rule. 2 Twenty-one states follow this rule.33
Under the "not as great as" approach, a plaintiff cannot re-
cover if his or her fault is equal to or greater than that of the
defendant.3 4 This approach is known as the "forty-nine percent"
rule. 3 Ten states currently follow this approach.3 6
28 Id. at 473.
29 Id.
30 See infra notes 33 and 36.
31 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 473.
32 Mutter, supra note 19, at 229.
33 Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(b) (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp.
1994); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Michie 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/
2-1116 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-3 to -4 (Burns 1986 &
Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 85 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-702 to -703 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1995); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1993);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1995); Estate of Nelson v. Con-
crete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1995).
34 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 473.
35 Mutter, supra note 19, at 258.
36 Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Utah, and West Virginia. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp.
1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-21-111 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-801 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 156 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); NE. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185 (Supp. 1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52
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Under the modified system of comparative negligence, there
are two methods of comparing the plaintiff's negligence to that
of multiple defendants. Under the "Wisconsin Rule," a plain-
tiff's negligence is compared with that of each individual de-
fendant.37  The plaintiff can recover against a particular
defendant only where the plaintiff's negligence is less than that
of the particular defendant.3 8 Some contend that this approach
discourages the plaintiff from suing all potentially liable defend-
ants and encourages defendants to join as many other defend-
ants as possible. 9 Under the second comparative method,
known as the "unit rule," the plaintiff can recover as long as his
or her negligence does not exceed the aggregate negligence of
all defendants. 40 The majority of modified comparative negli-
gence states follow the "unit rule. 4 1
Proponents of modified comparative negligence argue that it
is unfair to allow a plaintiff who is more at fault to recover from
a defendant who is less culpable.2  In Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co.,43 the West Virginia Supreme Court rejected pure com-
parative negligence and set forth the primary arguments in
favor of modified comparative negligence. 44 The court stated
that pure comparative negligence departed too far from com-
mon law fault concepts. 4 5 The court noted: "It is difficult, on
theoretical grounds alone, to rationalize a system which permits
a party who is 95 percent at fault to have his day in court as a
plaintiff because he is 5 percent fault-free."46 The court also em-
phasized that because all parties are potential plaintiffs under
pure comparative negligence, that approach favors a party who
has -sustained the most severe injuries, regardless of the level of
his or her fault.47 In addition, some commentators believe the
(Tenn. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1995); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
37 Mutter, supra note 19, at 258.
38 Id.
39 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 473-74.
40 Id. at 474.
41 Mutter, supra note 19, at 258.
42 Id. at 249.
43 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).






pure form of comparative negligence encourages "nuisance"
lawsuits and is, therefore, more costly.48
3. Slight-Gross
Under the slight-gross approach, a plaintiff is barred from re-
covery unless his or her negligence is "slight" and the, defend-
ant's is "gross." Where the plaintiff's negligence is "slight," his
or her recovery is reduced in proportion to his or her percent-
age of fault.49  Only two states, Nebraska and South Dakota,
have ever adopted the slight-gross approach.5" In 1992, how-
ever, Nebraska rejected the slight-gross approach and adopted
modified comparative negligence.5 '
B. CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFFASORS
The common law rule of no contribution among joint
tortfeasors was based upon the belief that injuries were indivisi-
ble and fault could not be apportioned. The rule, however, un-
fairly permitted the entire liability for a loss to be borne by a
single negligent defendant. It did not matter that others may
have contributed to an equal or greater degree to the plaintiff's
injuries. In addition, the rule was criticized because it en-
couraged plaintiffs to sue "deep pocket" defendants who might
be only marginally at fault.52
The common law rule was attacked for decades and by the
1960s, the majority of jurisdictions in the United States had
adopted statutes that permitted contribution among joint
tortfeasors.- 3 It has been noted that the move toward compara-
tive negligence accelerated the move toward contribution, as
many states' comparative negligence statutes provided for con-
tribution.54 Once apportionment of damages was permitted be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants, there was no longer any
substantial justification for denying apportionment among
tortfeasors through the vehicle of contribution.
Contribution is generally accomplished by one of two meth-
ods. Under the equality rule, liability is allocated equally among
48 See Mutter, supra note 19, at 237-43.
49 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 474.
50 See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2
(1995).
51 NEB. REv. STAT.,§ 25-21,185 (1985).
52 Mutter, supra note 19, at 203.
53 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 50, at 337.
54 See id. at 338 n.17.
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all joint tortfeasors.55 Under the "comparative contribution" ap-
proach, liability is apportioned in accordance with the
tortfeasors' respective percentage of fault.56
IV. TORT REFORM, PHASE TWO: APPORTIONMENT OF
DAMAGES AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS
While contribution solved some of the inequities engendered
by joint and several liability, contribution was not a "cure all."
Contribution provided no meaningful remedy to a "deep
pocket" defendant when a co-defendant or non-party whose
negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injury was an "empty
pocket," due to insolvency, lack of insurance, or immunity. In
such a case, the "deep pocket" would be liable for all of the
plaintiff's damages, pursuant to the doctrine ofjoint and several
liability.
The shortcomings of contribution were aptly illustrated in
Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood 57 a Florida case that received na-
tional attention.5 8 In that case, Ms. Wood was injured on a
grand prix attraction at Disney World when her fianc6 rammed
her miniature race car from behind. A jury found the plaintiff
fourteen percent at fault, her fiance eight-five percent at fault,
and Disney World one percent at fault.59 Applying the doctrines
of joint and several liability and comparative negligence, the
trial court entered judgment against Disney World for eighty-six
percent of the plaintiff's damages.6" Disney World had no re-
course against the plaintiff's fianc6. 61
Spurred by a national insurance crisis, and cases such as Wood,
which illustrate the unfair effects of joint and several liability,
many states have re-examined the doctrine.62 In the past dec-
ade, approximately thirty-five states have enacted some type of
55 Id. § 67, at 476.
56 Id.
57 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
58 See generally Armando Garcia-Mendoza, Comment, Tort Law:Joint and Several
Liability under Comparative Negligence-Forcing Old Doctrines on New Concepts, 40 U.
FLA. L. Rrv. 469 (1988).
59 Wood, 515 So. 2d at 199.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 202.
62 ScHwARTz, supra note 15, § 15.4, at 311 ("In the mid-1980's a significant
number of states changed the joint liability rule, in part because of growing
awards against 'deep pocket' defendants who might be only peripherally respon-
sible for the plaintiff's injuries.").
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tort reform act that modified or abolished joint and several
liability. 63
The real issue with apportionment of damages is whether the
plaintiff, or a solvent defendant, should bear the risk of a joint
torteasor's insolvency or absence. Some argue that several liabil-
ity unfairly places the risk on the plaintiff, who is probably in a
worse financial position to bear the risk than the solvent defend-
ant. On the other hand, a plaintiff has always borne the risk of
insolvency where a single defendant is involved. Under those
circumstances, the injured plaintiff recovers nothing. Where a
plaintiff is injured by two tortfeasors, each of whom is liable, and
one of whom is insolvent, little justification exists for allowing
the plaintiff to recover one hundred percent of his damages
from the solvent tortfeasor who was only partially at fault. In
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.," the New Mexico
Court of Appeals stated: "Between one plaintiff and one defend-
ant, the plaintiff bears the risk of the defendant being insolvent;
on what basis does the risk shift if there are two defendants, and
one is insolvent?" 65
The various approaches to apportionment of fault among
joint tortfeasors range from outright abolition to various modifi-
cations. In some states, statutes contain a variety of exceptions
to the abolition or modification of joint and several liability.
Other jurisdictions have modified joint and several liability by
enacting statutes that provide for its application only in limited
circumstances.
A. ABOLITION OR MODIFICATION OF JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY
1. Joint and Several Liability Abolished
A few states have abolished joint and several liability in favor
of several liability only, thereby limiting a defendant's liability to
his percentage of fault.66 Where several liability is adopted,
63 Mutter, supra note 19, at 203 ("[D]uring the last decade... [a]t least thirty-
five... states have restricted the joint and several doctrine in various ways; some
have virtually eliminated it.").
64 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
65 Id. at 585.
66 These states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyo-
ming. See Am. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.182 (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1992); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52
(Tenn. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (1992 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1995).
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there is no longer a need for the remedy of contribution be-
cause a defendant will only be liable for the percentage of the
plaintiff's damages occasioned by that defendant's negligence.
2. Joint and Several Liability Abolished or Modified Except for
Certain Types of Torts
In some states, legislatures have abolished or modified joint
and several liability except for certain types of torts. The most
common exception is for torts involving concerted action.68 In
addition, some statutes abolishing or modifying joint and several
liability contain exceptions for certain intentional torts,69 while
others except torts involving hazardous wastes.7 °
3. Dual Approach: Joint and Several Liability Retained Where
Plaintiff Is Fault-Free
Several states have adopted a dual approach, whereby joint
and several liability is retained if a plaintiff is fault-free, but such
liabilty is abolished in cases involving comparative negligence on
the part of the plaintiff.71 Where the plaintiff is without fault
and joint and several liability applies, tortfeasors who pay more
than their share of damages may seek contribution from other
tortfeasors.
4. Joint and Several Liability Abolished or Modified Depending
Upon Type of Damages
In a number of states, including California, Florida, New
York, and Oregon, statutes contain a distinction between eco-
67 McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992).
68 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1994 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
69 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.141 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1989).
70 ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1994 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 6-803
(1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Michie Supp. 1993).
71 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (Harrison 1994); IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (1990);
MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.067
(Vernon 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-2 (Michie 1989); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.19 (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 (West 1987);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). See generally William
J. McNichols, The Complexities of Oklahoma's Proportionate Several Liability Doctrine of
Comparative Negligence-Is Products Liability Next?, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 195 (1982).
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nomic and non-economic damages.72 In California, for in-
stance, joint and several liability is retained for economic
damages, but abolished for non-economic damages. 73 In Flor-
ida, joint and several liability is abolished for non-economic
damages, but retained for economic damages when a defend-
ant's percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of the plaintiff.7 4
5. Joint and Several Liability Modified Depending Upon
Defendant's Percentage of Liability
In a few states, application or modification ofjoint and several
liability depends upon a defendant's percentage of fault.75 In
Illinois, for example, several liability applies to a tortfeasor who
is less than twenty-five percent liable. 76 In Iowa, joint and sev-
eral liability applies unless a tortfeasor's fault is "less than fifty
percent of the total fault assigned to all parties." 7 In New
Jersey, joint and several liability applies to any tortfeasor liable
for sixty percent or more of the damages. If a tortfeasor is more
than twenty percent but less than sixty percent liable, joint and
several liability applies to economic damages, and several liabil-
ity applies to non-economic damages.78 Several liability also ap-
plies to a tortfeasor who is less than twenty percent liable. 79
6. Reallocation of Liability Where Judgment Cannot Be Collected
Against a Party
In a few states, statutes provide for reallocation of liability for
damages if a judgment against a particular defendant cannot be
collected. 0 In Connecticut, if a plaintiff is unable to collect a
72 See, e.g., CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 1431-1432 (Deering 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.81 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 1601 (McKinney Supp.
1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1993).
73 CAL. CrV. CODE § 1431.2 (Deering 1994).
74 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West Supp. 1995).
75 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1117 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-33 (Bums Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (1995); N.H. REv.' STAT. ANN. § 507:7 (Supp. 1994); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1601 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.485 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-
8-15.1 (1995).
76 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1117 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
77 IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1987).
78 N.J. STAT. ANN, § 2A:15-5.3 (West Supp. 1995).
79 Id.
80 These states are Connecticut, Michigan, and Missouri. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-572h (1995); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.067 (Vernon 1988).
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judgment against a particular defendant within one year, the
court will reallocate the uncollectible amount among the other
defendants according to their percentage of fault.8 1 In Michi-
gan and Missouri, the reallocation is among all parties; the
plaintiff, therefore, bears a part of the risk of a defendant's in-
solvency in proportion to the plaintiff's percentage of
negligence. 2
B. 'APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES TO ABSENT TORTFEAsORS
A tortfeasor may be absent from a lawsuit for a number of
reasons including insolvency, lack of insurance, or inability to
obtain jurisdiction over that party. This raises the question of
whether apportionment of damages should be permitted to a
nonparty. When fault is apportioned, the percentage of the
fault of named defendants is reduced.8 3 Apportionment to non-
parties is particularly beneficial to defendants in states that have
abolished or modified joint and several liability, because those
defendants will be liable only for their respective percentage of
fault.8 4
The arguments regarding whether apportionment should be
permitted to nonparties are the same as the arguments raised by
proponents and opponents ofjoint and several liability. Propo-
nents of several liability, who believe defendants should only be
liable for their percentage of liability, argue that the negligence
of nonparty tortfeasors must be considered in order to fairly de-
termine the percentage of fault of named defendants.8 5 Those
who believe the primary focus should be on adequate compen-
sation for the plaintiff argue that the fault of nonparties should
not be considered.86
In a few states where joint and several liability has been abol-
ished or modified, statutes specifically limit apportionment to
parties to the lawsuit, who are generally defined to include
claimants, defendants, settling defendants, and third party de-
fendants. 7 In a few states, the comparative negligence statutes
81 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1995).
82 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.067
(Vernon 1988).
83 Mutter, supra note 19, at 262.
84 Id. at 263.
85 Id. at 268.
86 Id.
87 See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.2 (West 1987).
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specifically provide that in assessing percentages of fault, the
fact finder should consider the fault of all entities who contrib-
uted to the injury, including nonparties8s
In the absence of a specific statutory provision, courts have
been virtually unanimous in holding that true apportionment
cannot be achieved unless it includes all negligent parties, re-
gardless of whether they are parties to the lawsuit.8 9 In Paul v.
N.L. Industries, Inc.,90 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated:
"To limit the jury to viewing the negligence of only one
tortfeasor and then ask it to apportion that negligence to the
overall wrong is to ask it to judge a forest by observing just one
tree."91 In addition, it appears that a majority of commentators
support apportionment of damages to non-parties. 92
Negligence of a nonparty, like negligence of a plaintiff, is gen-
erally considered to be an affirmative defense, which must be
pled by the defendant. Consequently, the defendant has the
burden of proof on the issue of a nonparty's negligence.93
88 Arizona's statute provides that "[iin assessing percentages of fault the trier
of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged in-
jury, death or damage to property, regardless of whether the person was, or could
have been, named as a party to the suit." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B)
(1994). Indiana's statute states: "[t]he jury shall determine the percentage of
fault of the claimant, of the primary defendant, and of any person who is a non-
party." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5(a)(1) (Burns Supp. 1995).
89 See Prince v. Leesona Corp., 720 F.2d 1166, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1983) (apply-
ing Kansas law); Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1226
(8th Cir. 1981) (applying Minnesota law); DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d
140, 144 (Cal. 1992); Fabre v. Main, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1183-87 (Fla. 1993); Poca-
tello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399, 402-03 (Idaho 1980);
Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 875-76 (Kan. 1978); Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896,
902-03 (Minn. 1978); Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824, 827 (Okla. 1986);
Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980); Sullivan v. Scoular Grain
Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878-84 (Utah 1993); Connar v. West Shore Equip., Inc., 227
N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975); Payne v. Bilco Co., 195 N.W.2d 641, 645-46 (Wis.
1972); Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613, 621 (W. Va. 1981).
90 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1980).
9' I& at 70.
92 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 475-76 ("But. the failure to
consider the negligence of all tortfeasors, whether parties or not, prejudices the
joined defendants who are thus required to bear a greater portion of the plain-
tiff's loss than is attributable to their fault."); Mutter, supra note 19, at 271
("Since the cornerstone of comparative negligence is an assessment of the fault
of all persons who contributed to the harm, consideration of the fault of
tortfeasors who are not named parties is a legitimate undertaking.").
9 See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-33-10 (Bums Supp. 1995). "The burden of proof
of a nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the
defense." Id. § 34-4-33-10(b).
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Statutes in some states require that a defendant give notice of
the fault of nonparties within a specified time after commence-
ment of a lawsuit. The Colorado statute, for instance, provides
that negligence or fault of a nonparty may be considered if the
claimant entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty
or if the defending party gives notice that a nonparty was wholly
or partially at fault within ninety days following commencement
of the action unless the court determines a longer period is nec-
essary.94 The statute further provides that notice must be given
by filing a pleading designating the nonparty and setting forth
the nonparty's name and last-known address, "or the best identi-
fication of such nonparty which is possible under the circum-
stances," together with a brief statement of the basis for
believing the nonparty to be at fault.95 The Indiana statute pro-
vides that a nonparty defense which is known to a defendant
must be pled as part of the first answer. A defendant who gains
knowledge of a nonparty defense after his or her answer has
been 'filed must plead the defense with reasonable
promptness.96
In Newville v. Department of Family Services,97 the Montana
Supreme Court recently held that Montana's comparative fault
act, as amended in 1987, is unconstitutional because it violates
plaintiffs' substantive due process rights.98 The amended act
provided that, for purposes of determining the percentage of
liability attributable to each party, "the trier of fact shall con-
sider the negligence of the claimant, injured person, defend-
ants, third-party defendants, persons released from liability by
the claimant, persons immune from liability to the claimant,
and any other persons who have a defense against the claim-
ant."99 The plaintiffs argued that the statute unfairly required
plaintiffs to prepare a defense at the last minute for nonparties
whom the defendants might seek to blame for the injury.1 °° The
94 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
95 Id
96 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(c) (Burns Supp. 1995).
97 883 P.2d 793 (Mont. 1994).
98 Id. at 803.
99 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(4) (1993). Montana's comparative fault act
was amended on April 5, 1995 to read: "For purposes of determining the percent-
age of liability attributable to each party ... the trier of fact shall consider the
negligence of the claimant, injured person, defendants, and third-party defend-
ants." Act of April 5, 1995, 1995 Mont. Laws 330 (to be codified at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-703(4)).
100 Nemville, 883 P.2d at 802.
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court held that the statute "unreasonably mandates an alloca-
tion of percentages of negligence to nonparties without any
kind of procedural safeguard." 10 1 The court stated that the stat-
ute unfairly imposed a burden on plaintiffs to anticipate defend-
ants' attempts to apportion blame up to the time of submission
of the verdict form to the jury. 10 2 The court noted that in other
jurisdictions where apportionment of fault to nonparties is per-
mitted, statutes contain specific procedural safeguards, such as
notice to plaintiffs and specific burdens of proof."3 Because of
the wide variety of apportionment statutes that have been
adopted, litigation will likely continue in this area for some
time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrines of contributory negligence and joint and sev-
eral liability, which are premised on a belief that juries cannot
"apportion" fault, have been criticized for decades. Conse-
quently, all but four states have now rejected contributory negli-
gence in favor of some form of comparative negligence.
Moreover, half of the states have re-examined joint and several
liability in the past decade and at least half of the states have
abolished or modified the doctrine. These tort reforms show a
clear movement toward equating liability with fault.
101 Id.
102 Id
103 I& at 802-03.
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